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1 Introduction
In this article we analyze the high-frequency price dynamics of European Union Al-
lowances (EUAs) traded on the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Our contribution to the literature on the modeling of EUA prices is twofold.
First, we establish that EUA high-frequency return data are characterized by a distin-
guished intraday seasonality pattern in their second conditional moment. Such intraday
seasonality has been proven to exist in other ﬁnancial markets such as stock returns and
exchange rates (see Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)),
but the ﬁnding of such a pattern which is linked to the intensity of the intraday mar-
ket activity is novel for EUA returns. Hence, a meaningful econometric analysis of the
data requires in a ﬁrst step to ﬁlter the returns in order to remove the seasonality. The
autocorrelation function of the absolute values of the appropriately ﬁltered return se-
ries is then shown to display a very slow decay behavior which is typical for time series
obeying long memory in their conditional second moment. In addition, there is clear
evidence for heteroskedasticity and asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks
in the conditional variance. We ﬁnd that a fractionally integrated asymmetric power
GARCH (FIAPGARCH) model is best suited for capturing all the stylized facts in the
high-frequency EUA returns. This model has been suggested by Tse (1998) and combines
the long memory property of the fractionally integrated GARCH (FIGARCH) speciﬁ-
cation of Baillie, Bollerslev, and Mikkelsen (1996) with the asymmetric power GARCH
(APGARCH) model of Ding, Engle, and Granger (1993). While previous research on
EUA prices had already established the conditional heteroskedasticity in daily returns
(e.g. Benz and Trueck (2009), Paolella and Taschini (2008) and Chevallier (2009)), the
ﬁnding of long memory in intraday returns is novel to this article. Since the FIAPGARCH
model nests several other GARCH speciﬁcations under certain parameter constraints,
we can use standard information criteria and likelihood ratio tests in order to rank the
competing models. We clearly show that the long memory FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation
outperforms the short memory GARCH models in terms of modeling performance.
Second, we provide a detailed analysis of the real-time response of EUA prices to the
releases of major macroeconomic announcements. The previous literature has identiﬁed
political and institutional decisions on the overall cap intensity, economic activity, energy
prices and temperature as the main EUA price drivers. For a comprehensive survey
on current research we refer to the overview article by Zhang and Wei (2010). Our
contribution has many distinguishing features. First of all, the previous literature was
entirely based on the analysis of daily data. However, since the response to news usually
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occurs very quickly in ﬁnancial markets, our high-frequency perspective appears to be
more appropriate. Further, for measuring the strength of the response of EUA prices
to the release of new information, we construct surprise variables which are based on
the diﬀerence of the actual ﬁgures and the market’s expectations. The expectations
data are obtained from surveys among market participants. This approach to measure
announcement eﬀects is commonly used in e.g. exchange rate markets (see Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and Conrad and Lamla (2007)). In contrast, previous
articles on the link between EUA prices and economic fundamentals have either exclusively
made use of the actual ﬁgures, but did not take into account expectations, or simply
employed dummy variables which indicated the occurrence of certain news events, but did
not control for the speciﬁc content of the news. In the empirical analysis we focus on the
releases of i) the European Commission’s (EC’s) decisions on second National Allocation
Plans (NAPs), ii) macroeconomic indicators about the future economic outlook and iii)
ﬁgures about the current economic stance. We show that the EUA prices react most
strongly to the EC’s decisions on second NAPs. The response occurs immediately after
the release of the new information and induces signiﬁcant price adjustments for at least 60
minutes. The direction of the price adjustment is in line with what economic theory would
suggest: a higher than expected allocation of emission rights leads to a fall in the EUA
price. This ﬁnding extends and complements the results in Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo
(2009) and Rotfuß, Conrad, and Rittler (2009). The reaction of the EUA prices to the
releases of macroeconomic ﬁgures is less strong. Nevertheless, whenever we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
reactions, they are generally of the expected sign. The econometric analysis reveals that
EUA prices weakly react to news about the future economic development. Positive news
which indicate higher economic activity lead to the expectation of increasing demand for
emission allowances and, hence, an increase in the EUA price. This ﬁnding is of central
importance, because in a previous study Chevallier (2009) had argued that “the carbon
market is only remotely connected to macroeconomic variables”. Hence, our results based
on a high-frequency framework provide supporting evidence for his conclusion which was
based on the analysis of daily data. Finally, we establish that EUA prices also respond
to news about the current economic stance (i.e. production activity). Our ﬁndings are in
line with the theoretical argument put forward by Alberola, Chevallier, and Che`ze (2009a)
and Alberola, Chevallier, and Che`ze (2009b), namely that the reaction will depend on the
potential short/long compliance positions of the industrial sectors which participate in the
trading scheme. Our estimates suggest that on average industrial sectors are characterized
by having long compliance positions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main features
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of the EU ETS. Related literature is reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data
and the econometric models. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6
concludes.
2 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
In 2003, the European Union (EU) established a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading. The scheme is substantially larger and by far more complex than
the pioneering U.S. system for sulfur dioxide. It is based on the Directive 2003/87/EC
and formally entered into operation in January 2005; ten years after the US predecessor
began operating. The purpose of the European trading scheme is to promote reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-eﬀective and economically eﬃcient manner. It aims to
assist EU Member States (member states in the following) in meeting their commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol at minimum costs and has been called the “New Grand Policy
Experiment” of market-based policies in environmental regulation (see Kruger and Pizer
(2004), for more details). The scheme requires selected industrial units to participate in
the trading of emission allowances. The program covers emissions from four broad sectors:
energy, production and processing of ferrous metals, minerals, and other energy-intensive
activities (in particular production of pulp and paper). The aviation sector is going to
be included in the EU ETS from 2013 onwards. Besides carbon dioxide (CO2) - that
accounts for the biggest share of covered gases - ﬁve other gases (methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs), perﬂuorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexaﬂuoride
(SF6)) that are supposed to have an impact on climate change are covered by the scheme.
One emission allowance grants the participating installation (or some other holder of
it) the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) during a speciﬁed
commitment phase. For a legal description of the EU ETS, see European-Parliament and
Council (2003).
The EU ETS is divided into three commitment phases (Phase I: 2005-2007, Phase II
2008-2012, Phase III: 2013-2020) and runs on the basis of a “cap-and-trade” system. The
EU ETS emission cap is deﬁned for each commitment phase by the so called “National
Allocation Plans”. We term these various plans as ﬁrst, second, or third NAPs according
to the commitment phases. The NAPs are deﬁned by each member state and contain
both the national total of allowances as well as a rule for distributing the allowances to
the participating installations. The EC approves each NAP and thereby sets the EU
ETS emission cap. In total there are 27 NAPs and, therefore, 27 decisions of the EC on
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the NAPs for each commitment phase.1 The allowances are grandfathered or auctioned,
whereas grandfathering has been the most common allocation rule in the ﬁrst two phases.
According to European-Parliament and Council (2009) auctioning should be the basic
principle for allocation from 2013 onwards. The allowances are freely tradable after they
have been allocated to the participating installations.
The participating installations are required to verify their emissions and to surrender the
equivalent number of EUAs or other eligible instruments to a competent authority on
an annual basis. Installations that have spare allowances can sell them on the market.
Inversely, any installation that lacks allowances has to purchase them from other instal-
lations or market participants. All emissions that are not covered by surrendered EUAs
or other eligible instruments are ﬁned with 40 e/tCO2e (in Phase I) or 100 e/tCO2e (in
Phase II) and additionally have to be turned in at the next compliance date.
The EU ETS is the largest emissions market in the world, but it is relatively small
compared to, e.g., energy markets. The annual emission cap equals 2299 million tCO2e
in the ﬁrst commitment period and 2081 million tCO2e in the second. The cap (as
an approximation of outstanding EUAs) and the average annual EUA price suggest an
annual market value of e30 billion in the ﬁrst phase and of e47 billion in the second
phase, respectively. According to Farrimond (2008), the European electricity market has
an estimated annual market value of approximately e224 billion.
Trading in emission rights takes place on organized markets and over-the-counter (OTC).
The trading in EUAs is not speciﬁcally regulated or supervised by the EC, although it sets
the framework. Trading is regulated by the member states and their national regulating
authorities. The most liquid EUA spot market is BlueNext in Paris, which attracts
approximately 70 percent of the total daily turnover of the whole organized spot market.
Besides an active EUA spot market there is also a vital derivatives market, where futures,
options, and other derivatives on EUAs are traded. The most liquid futures market is ICE
Futures in London, which absorbs circa 90 percent of the daily turnover in EUA futures.
The trading rules on all organized EUA spot and futures markets are largely identical.
3 Related Literature
This article can be considered as being part of a relatively new research area called
“carbon ﬁnance”. The recent papers by Paolella and Taschini (2008), Benz and Trueck
1Note that the national totals in Phase III will decrease linearly from the average national quantity
of allowances in Phase II. For more details, see European-Parliament and Council (2009).
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(2009) and Daskalakis, Psychoyios, and Markellos (2009) primarily focus on the stochastic
properties of EUA prices at a daily frequency. Among other things, these authors provide
evidence for conditional heteroskedasticity in daily EUA returns. In another stream of
articles the authors try to establish which fundamentals are the main price drivers in the
EUA market. The role of regulatory issues has been considered by Mansanet-Bataller
and Pardo (2009) and Alberola, Chevallier, and Che`ze (2008) who ﬁnd that the approval
of the overall cap or the veriﬁcation of actual emissions signiﬁcantly aﬀect the EUA
price. Other fundamental factors such as energy prices, weather or the overall economic
activity are analyzed, among others, in Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor (2007) and
Alberola, Chevallier, and Che`ze (2009a). Their results suggest that EUA prices are closely
connected to energy markets, in particular to electricity, gas and crude oil prices. In
addition, Alberola, Chevallier, and Che`ze (2009b) conclude that sectoral production also
signiﬁcantly determines the EUA price. To the contrary, it has been argued by Chevallier
(2009) that macroeconomic risk factors, such as the default spread, the short-term interest
rates or selected market portfolios are only loosely related to the EUA price.
Despite the growing interest in “carbon ﬁnance”, very few studies focus at the relation
between the EUA price and its fundamentals at high-frequency. The ﬁrst work in this
direction has been done by Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) and Rotfuß (2009), where the
former analyze the joint development of two diﬀerent exchange-based EUA price series,
and the latter provides selected features of the intraday price formation and volatility
in the EU ETS. More recent studies, for example Rittler (2009), focus on the relation
between EUA spot and futures prices at high-frequency. The present article builds on the
study of Rotfuß, Conrad, and Rittler (2009) in which the relation between EUA prices
and one fundamental factor, namely the determination of the overall supply of EUAs in
the second phase is analyzed.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Price Data
In the empirical analysis we employ high-frequency price data for second phase EUAs
which were obtained from the ICE Futures/European Carbon Exchange (ECX), the lead-
ing exchange for trading in EUA futures. We focus on price series of the EUA futures
contracts maturing in December 2008 (from 01/11/2006 to 15/12/2008) and in December
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2009 (from 16/12/2009 to 18/03/2009). Data prior to November 2006 is not considered
due to low liquidity in these instruments. Both EUA futures contracts have a maturity
of more than three years. They were launched in 2005 and matured on 12/15/2008 and
12/14/2009, respectively. In total, we consider 601 trading days, whereby we restrict the
analysis to on-exchange transactions. Trading in ICE Futures takes place every working
day between 7:00 and 17:00 GMT. The raw data ﬁles contain a total of 405,939 irregularly
spaced transaction records. Each transaction record consists of the transaction price and
the corresponding time stamp (measured up to the second) in GMT. A more detailed
description of the data can be found in Rotfuß (2009).
In order to explore the intraday price dynamics, we transform the irregularly spaced
transaction prices to equidistant price series. Figure 1 displays the equidistant 10-minutes
EUA prices for the period under consideration. The frequency of the series used in
our analysis is chosen to be ℎ = 10, 30 and 60 minutes, whereas 7:00 GMT is the ﬁrst
equidistant point in time. At each equidistant point in time the corresponding price is
calculated as the mean of the preceding and the immediately following price, unless there
is a transaction at the equidistant point itself. If there is no transaction at 17:00 GMT,
the last equidistant price equals the last recorded transaction price. To avoid overnight
eﬀects, we do not take the mean of transaction prices of two diﬀerent days.
Figure 1 about here.
Equidistant returns are constructed from the price series as follows
푅푡,푘(ℎ) = 100× (log(푃푡,푘(ℎ))− log(푃푡,푘−1(ℎ))), 푡 = 1, ..., 푇 and 푘 = 1, ..., 퐾(ℎ),
where 푃푡,푘(ℎ) represents the equidistant EUA price at the end of the 푘-th interval at day
푡, given the considered frequency ℎ. 푇 is the total number of trading days and 퐾(ℎ) the
number of equidistant intervals per trading day. 푃푡,0(ℎ) is deﬁned as the last equidistant
price on the preceding trading day 푡 − 1, unless there is a transaction exactly at 7:00
GMT.
At all three frequencies, the descriptive statistics (not reported) reveal that the EUA
returns have a mean which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, are slightly skewed to
the right and have a kurtosis that is signiﬁcantly greater than three. The Jarque-Bera
statistics reject normality and the outcome of the Engle LM tests suggest that there is
conditional heteroskedasticity. As often reported for high-frequency data, there is some
evidence for serial correlation at low lags in the high-frequency returns, possibly due to
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microstructure eﬀects. In sharp contrast, Figure 2 shows that the absolute returns are
highly correlated even for long lags.
Figure 2 about here.
The ﬁgure depicts exemplarily the sample autocorrelation function of the 10-minutes
absolute EUA returns for ﬁve consecutive trading days. The intraday periodic pattern is
clearly observable. Due to the 10-minutes frequency and a trading session of ten hours,
we have 60 equidistant intervals per trading day. The ﬁgure reveals a peak at the ﬁrst lag
and a fast decay of the sample autocorrelation function within the ﬁrst half of the trading
day (up to lag 30). After lag 30, the autocorrelation begins to increase towards a second
peak at the beginning of the next trading day (lag 60). The same seasonality pattern is
observed for the following days, whereas the amplitude of the subsequent peaks is slowly
decreasing. The pattern results from the intraday seasonality due to the time-varying
intensity of market activity which is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 about here.
The ﬁgure shows the average absolute returns, 푓푘(ℎ) =
1
푇
∑푇
푡=1 ∣푅푡,푘(ℎ)∣, for each interval
푘 = 1, ..., 60. The average absolute returns are high at the beginning of the trading session
and then decrease until mid-day. After mid-day, the average absolute returns are again
slightly increasing. Although less pronounced, this pattern of the absolute EUA returns
resembles the typical intraday U-shaped pattern observed in other ﬁnancial markets (see,
e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)).
There are several ways to deal with the intraday seasonality (see, e.g., Martens, Chang,
and Taylor (2002)). A simple but very eﬀective method is to standardize 푅푡,푘 according
to the following rule:
푟푡,푘(ℎ) =
푅푡,푘(ℎ)
푓푘(ℎ)
.
The standardization simply scales each return 푅푡,푘 by the average absolute return of
the interval 푘. Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀect of the ﬁltering by displaying the sample
autocorrelation function of ∣푟푡,푘∣ for ﬁve consecutive trading days, where again we ﬁx the
frequency at ℎ = 10. As evident from the ﬁgure, the sample autocorrelation function
does not exhibit any remaining seasonality. In fact, it decreases smoothly with increasing
lags. However, its slow decay points to a long memory property in the volatility of
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EUA returns (see Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)). Having observed this property, it
appears reasonable to use a long memory GARCH speciﬁcation to asses the impact of the
announcement releases on the EUA prices.
Figure 4 about here.
4.1.2 Announcement Data
As mentioned before, previous research has identiﬁed political and institutional decisions
on the overall cap stringency, energy prices, temperature events and economic activity
as the main EUA price drivers. In our high-frequency analysis of announcement eﬀects
we will focus on regulatory issues and measures of economic activity. Further, among
the measures of economic activity we distinguish between those which capture the future
economic outlook and those which capture the contemporaneous macroeconomic situa-
tion. More speciﬁcally, we consider the releases of i) the EC’s decisions on second NAPs,
ii) leading economic indicators that are supposed to reﬂect the views of the market par-
ticipants on the future economic development, and iii) macroeconomic ﬁgures that are
supposed to capture the real economic activity in the European Union and its biggest
members states (Germany, Great Britain, and France). In addition, we also make use
of data from those US announcements which have been shown to aﬀect other European
assets prices in previous studies (see, e.g., Andersson, Overby, and Sebestyen (2009)).
The econometric analysis of the announcement eﬀects is then based on the diﬀerences of
realized and expected ﬁgures.
Table 1 about here.
In total we make use of 푖 = 13 announcement series which span the period 11/2006 to
03/2009. The individual observations for each of the announcement series consist of the
time stamp of the announcement release (푡, 푘), the realized value 푦푖푡,푘, and the median 푦ˆ
푖
푡,푘
of the corresponding expectations of the market participants. With the exception of the
decisions on second NAPs, all realized and expected data were obtained from the Forex
Factory (forexfactory.com, FF in the following) database. FF compiles the expectations
either from the Bloomberg or from the Reuters press releases, which are publicly available
shortly after the announcements. The expectation data are consensus forecasts, which
Bloomberg and Reuters obtain by means of surveys few days prior to the announcements.
The data on the EC’s decisions on second NAPs were obtained from Rotfuß, Conrad,
and Rittler (2009). In contrast to the FF data, they are constructed from a model of
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expectation formation, where agents anticipate the decisions of the EC on second NAPs.
The model assumes that market participants expect the national total in Phase II to be
the minimum of either the number of EUAs submitted by the member state or a lump
sum cut amount of its national total in Phase I. For a more detailed discussion of the
model see Rotfuß, Conrad, and Rittler (2009).
An overview of the announcement data along with a test for the unbiasedness of the
expectations is provided by Table 1. The standard procedure to test for the unbiasedness
of expectations is to run a linear regression of the realized value on an intercept and the
expected value. The expectations can be assumed to be unbiased, if the estimates for
the intercept and the slope coeﬃcient are not statistically diﬀerent from zero and unity,
respectively. As can be seen from Table 1, in all regressions the 푅2 is relatively high and
the null hypothesis of unbiased expectations, 퐻0 : 훽1 = 0 and 훽2 = 1, can only be rejected
in two (four) out of the thirteen cases at the 5% (10%) level. Thus, we conclude that the
survey expectations can be considered as being of good quality.
Since the units of measurement diﬀer across the various announcement variables, we follow
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and standardize the surprise variables,
i.e. the diﬀerence between the realized and expected values, as:
푆푖푡,푘 =
푦푖푡,푘 − 푦ˆ푖푡,푘
푠푖
,
where 푠푖 is the sample standard deviation of the forecast error for announcement 푖. We
refer to the resulting variables 푆푖푡,푘 as the standardized surprises.
Next, we brieﬂy discuss the expected eﬀects of surprises in the three groups of announce-
ment variables. Since a positive surprise in the NAP represents an unexpected increase
of the national total in Phase II of a member state, we should expect a price decline
simply because of increasing supply. Similarly, better than expected ﬁgures on the fu-
ture economic development should signal a higher future demand for emission allowances
because of increasing economic activity and, hence, an increase in EUA prices. The ex-
pected response to the actual economic activity is more complex. On the one hand, higher
than expected actual activity should induce higher demand and therefore increasing EUA
prices. On the other hand, the response to surprises in the actual activity will depend on
the potential long/short compliance positions held by the industrial sectors. Note, that
the expectations reported from the participants of the survey do not necessarily have to
coincide with the projections of the sectors which indeed have to deliver the allowances.
E.g. the results presented in Alberola, Chevallier, and Che`ze (2009b) suggest that in
the period 2005-2006 there has been a predominance of net long compliance positions in
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important industrial sectors. In such a situation even a positive surprise on the actual
economic activity can lead to declining EUA prices.
4.2 Methodology
In order to capture the news eﬀects on EUA prices, we model the continuously com-
pounded EUA returns as a function of their own ﬁrst lag and the contemporaneous and
푃 lagged values of the standardized surprise variables. To simplify the notation, we now
change the index of the return and surprise variables from (푡, 푘) to 푛, where 푛 = 1, . . . , 푇퐾.
The mean equation is then given by
푟푛 = 휇+ 휃푟푛−1 +
13∑
푖=1
푃∑
푝=0
휃푖,푝푆
푖
푛−푝 + 휀푛, (1)
where the error term 휀푛 is given by 휀푛 = 휎푛푍푛 with {푍푛} being a sequence of independent
and identically distributed random variables with E(푍푛) = 0, E(푍
2
푛) = 1 and 휎
2
푛 being
the conditional variance. Since the empirical autocorrelation function of the absolute
ﬁltered returns revealed a clear pattern of long memory and persistence, we follow Tse
(1998) and model the conditional variance as a fractionally integrated asymmetric power
GARCH (FIAPGARCH(1, 푑, 1)) process given by
(1− 훽퐿)휎훿푛 = 휔 +
(
(1− 훽퐿)− (1− 휙퐿)(1− 퐿)푑) (∣휀푛−1∣ − 훾휀푛−1)훿, (2)
where 퐿 denotes the lag operator and 훽/휙 are the autoregressive/moving average param-
eters of the variance equation. The fractional diﬀerencing parameter 0 ≤ 푑 ≤ 1 allows
us to capture the long memory in the volatility and 훿 > 0 denotes the optimal power
transformation. Finally, the asymmetry term ∣훾∣ < 1 ensures that positive and negative
innovations of the same size can have asymmetric eﬀects on the conditional variance. In
addition, for the conditional variance to be non-negative almost surely for all 푛, the pa-
rameter combination (훽, 푑, 휙) has to satisfy the inequality constraints derived in Conrad
(2007) and Conrad and Haag (2006).
The ﬂexible FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation nests several standard GARCH models. For 훿 = 2
it reduces to an asymmetric FIGARCH (FIAGARCH) speciﬁcation and under the addi-
tional constraint that 훾 = 0 to the symmetric FIGARCH one (see Baillie, Bollerslev, and
Mikkelsen (1996)).
On the other hand, for 푑 = 0 the model reduces to a short memory asymmetric power
GARCH (APGARCH) speciﬁcation and under the additional constraint that 훿 = 2 to the
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asymmetric GARCH (AGARCH) model (see Ding, Engle, and Granger (1993)). In this
last case, the conditional variance takes the familiar form 휎2푛 = 휔 + 훼(∣휀푛−1∣ − 훾휀푛−1)2 +
훽휎2푛−1 with 훼 = 휙− 훽.
All models will be estimated by using the quasi-maximum-likelihood method as imple-
mented by Laurent and Peters (2002) in the G@RCH package for Ox, which allows us
to draw robust inference even if the return data are non-Gaussian. Finally, we can use
standard information criteria and likelihood ratio tests to discriminate between the most
general FIAPGARCH model and the nested GARCH speciﬁcations (see Conrad, Karana-
sos, and Zeng (2008)).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Baseline Speciﬁcations
We begin the empirical analysis by ﬁrst estimating the four GARCH speciﬁcations at
the 10-, 30- and 60-minutes frequency without including any explanatory variables. By
doing so, we will identify the GARCH speciﬁcation which is most suited for modeling the
high-frequency EUA return data. The results are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. At the
10-minutes frequency, in all four GARCH speciﬁcations the autoregressive and moving av-
erage parameters are highly signiﬁcant. In addition, the asymmetry term is signiﬁcantly
positive in all four models, which suggests that the conditional variance of EUA returns
increases considerably more in response to negative innovations than to positive ones
of the same size. The fractional diﬀerencing parameter in the FIAGARCH and FIAP-
GARCH models take values around 0.25 which are signiﬁcantly above zero. Such a degree
of volatility persistence is well in line with the ones observed in other ﬁnancial markets,
such as exchange rates (see, e.g., Conrad and Lamla (2007)). Clearly, the evidence for
long memory which was already evident in Figure 4 is reinforced by our coeﬃcient esti-
mates.2 The estimated FIAGARCH and FIAPGARCH parameter combinations (훽, 푑, 휙)
satisfy the inequality constraints derived in Conrad (2007) and, thus, guarantee the non-
negativity of the conditional variances. Further, the optimal power transformation in the
FIAPGARCH model is estimated to be signiﬁcantly greater than two and, hence, restrict-
ing it to two may lead to suboptimal modeling and forecasting performance (see Brooks,
2Also note that the sum of the 훼 and 훽 parameters in the two short memory GARCH speciﬁcations
is close to and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. This feature is often called the ‘integrated GARCH
(IGARCH)’ eﬀect and – as argued in Baillie, Bollerslev, and Mikkelsen (1996) – is due to misspeciﬁcation
of the conditional variance equation because of the neglected long memory property.
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Faﬀ, and McKenzie (2000)). Comparing the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria
(AIC and SIC) of the FIAPGARCH model with those from the models which impose the
restrictions 훿 = 2 (FIAGARCH), 푑 = 0 (APGARCH) or 훿 = 2 and 푑 = 0 (AGARCH)
clearly leads to the conclusion that the most general FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation is the
preferred one. This conclusion is reinforced from the results of the likelihood ratio tests,
which clearly reject the restricted models in favor of the most general speciﬁcation in all
cases. Also, the Ljung-Box statistics show that there is no remaining serial correlation in
the squared standardized residuals from the FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation. In sharp con-
trast, the hypothesis of uncorrelated squared standardized residuals is strongly rejected
for the short memory APGARCH and AGARCH models. Finally, in the mean equation
the estimated constants are insigniﬁcant for all four models, but the estimated ﬁrst order
autoregressive coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly positive.
Table 2 about here.
As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, the empirical results for the 30- and 60-minutes
frequency are very similar to the one from the 10-minutes frequency. The information
criteria unanimously favor the FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation as the best one. With a single
exception this also holds for the likelihood ratio tests. Only at the 60-minutes frequency
we cannot reject the hypothesis that 훿 = 2 in the FIAPGARCH model. Further, it is
interesting to note that the estimated fractional diﬀerencing parameters are increasing
with decreasing sampling frequency. Similarly, the eﬀect of the asymmetry on the condi-
tional variance becomes stronger with decreasing sampling frequency. Finally, while the
estimated power terms are greater than two at the 10- and 30-minutes frequency, the
estimated values are below two at the 60-minutes frequency.
Table 3 about here.
Table 4 about here.
In summary, based on the results for the four GARCH speciﬁcations without including
any explanatory variables the most general FIAPGARCH model can be clearly identiﬁed
as producing the best ﬁt to the data at all three frequencies. Hence, in the subsequent
analysis of the announcement eﬀects we will employ the FIAPGARCH model as our
baseline speciﬁcation.
13
5.2 Measuring Announcement Eﬀects
In a ﬁrst step we now augment the FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation from above by the con-
temporaneous standardized surprise variables from the 13 macroeconomic announcement
series. The corresponding results at the three data frequencies are presented in Table 5.
We ﬁrst focus on the releases of the EC’s decisions on second NAP’s. The reaction to
the announcements of the EC’s decisions is highly signiﬁcant (at the 5% level) at the 10-
and 60-minutes frequency and marginally signiﬁcant (at the 15% level) at the 30-minutes
frequency. In line with our discussion in Section 4.1.2, a surprise allocation of more than
expected NAP’s leads to an immediate decline of the EUA price, which lasts at least for
60 minutes. The price drop is strongest after 10 minutes with a value of -3.0934 and then
settles at -0.6214. This ﬁnding is line with the results reported in Rotfuß, Conrad, and
Rittler (2009), who employed a cross sectional regression approach.
Table 5 about here.
Among the variables which are meant to capture the tendency of the future economic
development, DE new orders and US nonfarm payrolls evoke a marginally signiﬁcant
price reaction after 30- and 60-minutes (at the 10% and 15% level), respectively. As
expected, in both cases the reaction is positive, which is line with the argument that the
prospect of stronger economic growth will increase emissions and, thereby, the demand
for allowances.
Looking at the variables which reﬂect the current stance of the economy, we ﬁnd a negative
reaction to positive surprises in the DE industrial production after 60-minutes and the
US ISM manufacturer index after 30-minutes (both signiﬁcant at the 5% level). The
reaction to EU industrial production is negative at the 30- and 60-minutes frequency (at
the 15% and 10% level, respectively). As argued by Zhang and Wei (2010) and Alberola,
Chevallier, and Che`ze (2009b) this ﬁnding may be explained by the fact that industrials
hedge their allowances and, hence, there may be a predominance of net long compliance
positions in the period under consideration.
Note, that the estimated values of the structural coeﬃcients in the three conditional mean
and variance equations are almost identical to the corresponding ones that we obtained
for the baseline speciﬁcations without any surprise variables in the mean equation. Also,
based on the Ljung-Box statistics there is no evidence for misspeciﬁcation in the squared
standardized residuals.
In summary, we ﬁnd that the NAP approvals have an immediate, long lasting and by
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far the strongest eﬀect on EUA prices. For the other surprise variables it takes at least
30 minutes to generate a signiﬁcant market reaction. Two of the variables which reﬂect
the expectations about the future economic development have a signiﬁcant eﬀect which
is of the anticipated sign. On the other hand, positive surprises on contemporaneous
economic activity variables lead to a decline in EUA prices. Nevertheless, the majority
of the macroeconomic releases does not appear to generate a signiﬁcant reaction of the
EUA prices. However, one should keep in mind that these are preliminary results, which
do not take into account the complicated lead lag structure in the response to the release
of macroeconomic announcements often observed in other ﬁnancial markets shortly after
the release. Hence, in a second step we rerun the regression at the 10-minutes frequency,
but now include several lagged values of the surprise variables.
The results for this extended model are presented in Table 6. We include up to 3 lags of
the standardized surprise variables such that a 40-minutes period is covered.3
Table 6 about here.
As before, the overall reaction to the NAP announcement is negative. However, it is
interesting to note that after the strong price decline within the ﬁrst 10-minutes, there
is a signiﬁcant price reversal which is then followed a ﬁnal price decline. This detailed
analysis of the price reaction was not possible by simply looking at the reaction at diﬀerent
frequencies (as was done in Table 5), but required the inclusion of lagged surprises.
The results for the forward looking indicators conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings. In addition
to DE new orders and US nonfarm payrolls, we now ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant reaction
to speciﬁc lags of the DE Ifo index and the DE ZEW index as well. Thus, better than
expected economic prospects lead to increasing demand for allowances which induces the
EUA price to increase.
For the EU industrial production, the GB industrial production and the US ISM manufac-
turer index the evidence is now mixed. At some lags the estimated reaction is signiﬁcantly
positive, at others signiﬁcantly negative. However, in two of the three cases the sum of
the signiﬁcantly estimated coeﬃcients is negative, thus leading to the same conclusion as
before.
Deﬁnitely, the analysis with lagged standardized surprise variables allows us to gain some
additional insights into the way the EUA prices adjust to new information. The reactions
3Including additional lagged values did not change our conclusion in a signiﬁcant way. Of course, the
results are available from the authors upon request.
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that we estimated for the diﬀerent models lead to a very coherent and compelling picture.
Apart from the immediate reaction to EU NAPs, the response of the EUA price to the
release of new information seems to take at least 10-minutes and appears to be rather
tenuous. This is a remarkable ﬁnding, since in other ﬁnancial markets the adjustments to
news typically take place within a few minutes or even seconds (see Andersen, Bollerslev,
Diebold, and Vega (2003)). The comparatively slow reaction of the EUA prices may be
due to the fact that the European carbon market is still relatively new.
6 Conclusions
This article contributes to the steadily expanding literature on the modeling and explain-
ing of the movements in EUA prices. The distinguishing feature of our contribution lies
in investigating the price dynamics from a high-frequency perspective. Analyzing return
data for the EUA futures contracts maturing in December 2008 and in December 2009, we
show that the best ﬁt is achieved by a fractionally integrated asymmetric power GARCH
speciﬁcation. Thus, we establish that high-frequency EUA returns do not only obey con-
ditional heteroskedasticity, but are also characterized by long memory, power eﬀects and
asymmetry in their second conditional moments. As shown in Conrad, Karanasos, and
Zeng (2008) for stock index returns, the adequate modeling of such properties is crucial
for the model performance.
Moreover, we investigate how EUA prices respond to the release of the EC’s decisions on
second NAPs, macroeconomic announcements on the future economic development and
the actual economic activity. We ﬁnd that the reaction to the EC’s decisions on second
NAPs is immediate and of the expected sign. To the contrary, the link between EUA
prices and the releases of macroeconomic ﬁgures is found to be tenuous. The empiri-
cal evidence suggests that leading economic indicators which point towards higher than
expected growth in the future, induce an increase in EUA prices, whereas the response
does not follow immediately but takes at least 10-minutes to occur. Also, the reaction to
announcements on the actual economic activity is ambiguous, i.e. the sign of the response
changes with the time-lag under consideration. However, the empirical results are well
in line with the view that on average industrial sectors were holding long positions in
emission allowances in the period under consideration. From the size and the strength
of the response of EUA prices to the various data releases, we conclude that NAP an-
nouncements which directly aﬀect the supply of emission allowances are by far the most
important driving force of EUA prices.
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Figure 1: Equidistant 10-minutes EUA prices of the EUA futures contracts maturing in December 2008
(from 01/11/2006 to 15/12/2008) and in December 2009 (from 16/12/2009 to 18/03/2009). In total there
are 퐾 × 푇 = 60× 601 = 36060 observations at the 10-minutes frequency.
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Figure 2: Autocorrelation function of absolute EUA returns (ℎ = 10) for ﬁve consecutive trading days.
Dashed lines represent 95% conﬁdence bands.
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Figure 3: Average absolute 10-minutes EUA returns for each 10-minute interval during a trading day.
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Figure 4: Autocorrelation function of ﬁltered 10-minutes absolute EUA returns for ﬁve consecutive
trading days. Dashed lines are 95% conﬁdence bands.
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Table 1: Announcement Data and Tests of Unbiasedness of Expectations
Announcement # obs. 훽1 훽2 푅2 Wald test
Policy Variable
EU NAP 27 0.434
(1.397)
0.982
(0.011)
0.997 1.75
[0.194]
Future Economic Outlook
DE Ifo index 28 −4.072
(3.736)
1.038
(0.037)
0.968 0.93
[0.408]
DE ZEW index 29 −1.068
(2.192)
0.925
(0.061)
0.893 0.88
[0.428]
EU consumer conﬁdence 28 0.069
(0.469)
1.051
(0.032)
0.977 3.15
[0.059]
US Uni-Michigan index adv. 29 2.724
(4.389)
0.956
(0.058)
0.910 0.51
[0.604]
DE new orders 29 −0.008
(0.006)
1.821
(0.006)
0.334 2.83
[0.076]
EU new orders 28 0.004
(0.003)
1.206
(0.146)
0.724 1.35
[0.277]
US nonfarm payrolls 27 −16.220
(11.029)
1.067
(0.051)
0.941 2.29
[0.121]
Current Economic Activity
DE industrial production 29 −0.003
(0.003)
1.586
(0.243)
0.611 3.99
[0.030]
EU industrial production 28 0.000
(0.001)
0.950
(0.100)
0.776 0.13
[0.876]
FR industrial production 29 −0.003
(0.002)
1.446
(0.326)
0.421 2.17
[0.133]
GB industrial production 29 −0.003
(0.001)
1.742
(0.199)
0.740 14.97
[0.000]
US ISM manufacturer index 29 1.808
(3.276)
0.960
(0.067)
0.883 0.23
[0.796]
Notes: The ﬁrst two columns contain the name and the number of observations of the announcement
series. The third to ﬁfth columns contain the estimates from the regression 푦푖푡,푘 = 훽1+훽2 ⋅ 푦ˆ푖푡,푘+휂푖푡,푘
and the corresponding 푅2. The last column shows the results of a Wald test of the joint hypothesis
퐻0 : 훽1 = 0 and 훽2 = 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, numbers in brackets are
푝-values.
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Table 2: GARCH Models at 10-Minutes Frequency
AGARCH APGARCH FIAGARCH FIAPGARCH
Mean Equation
휇 −0.0116
(0.0074)
−0.0111
(0.0073)
−0.0102
(0.0070)
−0.0097
(0.0069)
휃 0.0210★★★
(0.0072)
0.0212★★★
(0.0071)
0.0325★★★
(0.0070)
0.0319★★★
(0.0068)
Variance Equation
휔 0.0241★★
(0.0090)
0.0243★★
(0.0093)
0.1274★★
(0.0286)
0.1093★★
(0.0321)
훼 0.0400★★★
(0.0093)
0.0386★★★
(0.0094)
휙 0.4633★★★
(0.0686)
0.4491★★★
(0.0937)
훽 0.9514★★★
(0.0118)
0.9509★★★
(0.0119)
0.6200★★★
(0.0643)
0.5699★★★
(0.0936)
훾 0.1144★★★
(0.0264)
0.1110★★★
(0.0250)
0.1247★★★
(0.0270)
0.1119★★★
(0.0238)
훿 2.0920
(0.1174)
2.1699
(0.0730)
푑 0.2812★★★
(0.0224)
0.2397★★★
(0.0296)
AIC 3.658 3.658 3.633 3.632∗
SIC 3.659 3.659 3.635 3.634∗
푄2(20) 97.320
[0.000]
93.245
[0.000]
23.529
[0.171]
20.734
[0.293]
LR 933.980
[0.000]
928.786
[0.000]
47.206
[0.000]
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust stan-
dard errors. ★★★, ★★, ★ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level.
AIC and SIC are the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria. 푄2(20) is
the Ljung-Box statistic for the squared standardized residuals at lag 20. LR
is the likelihood ratio test 퐿푅 = 2[퐿푈푅 − 퐿푅], where 퐿푈푅 is the likelihood
of the unrestricted FIAPGARCH speciﬁcation and 퐿푅 the likelihood of the
restricted model. The numbers in brackets are 푝-values.
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Table 3: GARCH Models at 30-Minutes Frequency
AGARCH APGARCH FIAGARCH FIAPGARCH
Mean Equation
휇 −0.0099
(0.0109)
−0.0088
(0.0108)
−0.0064
(0.0106)
−0.0061
(0.0106)
휃 0.0080
(0.0110)
0.0089
(0.0109)
0.0053
(0.0109)
0.0058
(0.0107)
Variance Equation
휔 0.0205★★
(0.0090)
0.0208★★
(0.0090)
0.0785★★
(0.0244)
0.0632★★
(0.0258)
훼 0.0546★★★
(0.0137)
0.0505★★★
(0.0136)
휙 0.3849★★★
(0.0829)
0.3650★★★
(0.1213)
훽 0.9361★★★
(0.0171)
0.9346★★★
(0.0170)
0.5781★★★
(0.0853)
0.5134★★★
(0.1354)
훾 0.1329★★★
(0.0395)
0.1256★★★
(0.0337)
0.1652★★★
(0.0365)
0.1532★★★
(0.0330)
훿 2.2205
(0.1902)
2.1787
(0.1026)
푑 0.3118★★★
(0.0293)
0.2625★★★
(0.0420)
AIC 3.411 3.410 3.394 3.393∗
SIC 3.415 3.414 3.399 3.398∗
푄2(20) 73.369
[0.000]
64.137
[0.000]
22.221
[0.222]
20.900
[0.284]
LR 212.754
[0.000]
206.606
[0.000]
11.828
[0.001]
Notes: As in Table 2.
Table 4: GARCH Models at 60-Minutes Frequency
AGARCH APGARCH FIAGARCH FIAPGARCH
Mean Equation
휇 −0.0111
(0.0151)
−0.0143
(0.0162)
−0.0121
(0.0146)
−0.0121
(0.0146)
휃 0.0076
(0.0155)
0.0083
(0.0165)
0.0066
(0.0164)
0.0066
(0.0164)
Variance Equation
휔 0.0181★★★
(0.0075)
0.0171★★★
(0.0068)
0.0550★★★
(0.0252)
0.0574★★★
(0.0262)
훼 0.0502★★★
(0.0126)
0.0590★★★
(0.0141)
휙 0.5179★★★
(0.1182)
0.5135★★★
(0.1161)
훽 0.9407★★★
(0.0150)
0.9413★★★
(0.0142)
0.6872★★★
(0.1018)
0.6915★★★
(0.1017)
훾 0.1748★★★
(0.0517)
0.2058★★★
(0.0696)
0.2150★★★
(0.0606)
0.2184★★★
(0.0674)
훿 1.5505
(0.1918)
1.9673
(0.1739)
푑 0.3206★★★
(0.0433)
0.3303★★★
(0.0683)
AIC 3.379 3.376 3.363 3.362∗
SIC 3.387 3.384 3.372 3.372∗
푄2(20) 35.484
[0.000]
42.600
[0.000]
21.467
[0.257]
21.560
[0.252]
LR 97.708
[0.000]
83.170
[0.000]
0.122
[0.729]
Notes: As in Table 2.
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Table 5: FIAPGARCH Model with Contemporaneous Surprises
10-min 30-min 60-min
Mean Equation
휇 −0.0101
(0.0069)
−0.0062
(0.0106)
−0.0116
(0.0145)
휃 0.0328★★★
(0.0069)
0.0048
(0.0107)
0.0052
(0.0164)
EU NAP −3.0934★★
(1.2296)
−0.7709+
(0.5260)
−0.6214★★
(0.2932)
DE Ifo index 0.0278
(0.1419)
−0.1315
(0.1971)
−0.1357
(0.2083)
DE ZEW index −0.1049
(0.1693)
−0.1218
(0.2364)
0.2527
(0.1856)
EU Consumer conﬁdence 0.0891
(0.2944)
−0.1965
(0.2732)
−0.2676
(0.1937)
US Uni-Michigan index adv. 0.0785
(0.1451)
0.1313
(0.1894)
0.1862
(0.1710)
DE new orders 0.2348
(0.2874)
0.5003★
(0.2633)
0.3147
(0.2334)
EU new orders 0.0061
(0.2189)
−0.2070
(0.1195)
−0.1794
(0.1392)
US nonfarm payrolls 0.3443
(0.3802)
0.2618
(0.3200)
0.4885+
(0.3174)
DE industrial production −0.0561
(0.1952)
−0.1201
(0.2194)
−0.3112★★
(0.1535)
EU industrial production −0.1101
(0.1204)
−0.1891+
(0.1262)
−0.2969★
(0.1792)
FR industrial production −0.0343
(0.2036)
−0.1283
(0.2697)
−0.0211
(0.2082)
GB industrial production 0.1336
(0.3101)
0.2034
(0.1812)
0.1487
(0.1574)
US ISM manufacturer index 0.1001
(0.2704)
−0.4439★★
(0.1932)
−0.3859
(0.2818)
Variance Equation
휔 0.1125★★★
(0.0338)
0.0632★★
(0.0260)
0.0550★★
(0.0255)
휙 0.4304★★★
(0.0979)
0.3631★★★
(0.1242)
0.5258★★★
(0.1122)
훽 0.5507★★★
(0.1006)
0.5093★★★
(0.1386)
0.7066★★★
(0.0954)
훾 0.1178★★★
(0.0235)
0.1534★★★
(0.0331)
0.2211★★★
(0.0680)
훿 2.1814
(0.0742)
2.1818
(0.1029)
1.9519
(0.1793)
푑 0.2344★★★
(0.0299)
0.2609★★★
(0.0420)
0.3387★★★
(0.0702)
푄2(20) 20.914
[0.284]
19.928
[0.337]
21.099
[0.274]
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust stan-
dard errors. ★★★, ★★, ★, + indicate signiﬁcance at the 1 %, 5 %, 10 % and 15%
level. The numbers in brackets are 푝-values.
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Table 6: FIAPGARCH Model with Lagged Surprises at 10-Minutes Frequency
Mean Equation
Lag
0 1 2 3
휇 −0.0094
(0.0069)
휃 0.0329★★★
(0.0068)
EU NAP −2.7557★★★
(0.7107)
2.0671★★★
(0.3681)
−0.6378★
(0.3495)
−0.0446
(0.2469)
DE Ifo index 0.0473
(0.1394)
0.1809
(0.2577)
0.0887
(0.1609)
0.4191★★
(0.1980)
DE ZEW index −0.1009
(0.1771)
0.4429+
(0.2772)
−0.4452
(0.3376)
−0.1210
(0.1476)
EU Consumer conﬁdence 0.0959
(0.3000)
0.1871
(0.3076)
0.1799
(0.3317)
−0.0555
(0.2830)
US Uni-Michigan index adv. 0.0800
(0.1433)
−0.1288
(0.1446)
0.2339
(0.2824)
0.0654
(0.2283)
DE new orders 0.2221
(0.2728)
0.2010
(0.1699)
0.4931★
(0.2674)
−0.0763
(0.2256)
EU new orders 0.0031
(0.2239)
−0.1677
(0.2039)
−0.0183
(0.1224)
−0.0681
(0.2542)
US nonfarm payrolls 0.4397
(0.3431)
0.5560+
(0.3431)
−0.3843
(0.3712)
0.2815
(0.2344)
DE industrial production −0.0453
(0.1874)
0.2684
(0.2678)
−0.1487
(0.2943)
−0.2520
(0.4752)
EU industrial production −0.1182
(0.1186)
−0.2067★★
(0.0850)
−0.0783
(0.0977)
0.2968★★
(0.1336)
FR industrial production −0.0309
(0.1980)
0.0559
(0.1353)
0.1350
(0.1666)
−0.0517
(0.5377)
GB industrial production 0.1373
(0.3112)
0.4915★★
(0.2096)
−0.6312★
(0.3560)
0.2317
(0.3959)
US ISM manufacturer index 0.1098
(0.2657)
0.3960★★
(0.1779)
−0.4820+
(0.3210)
0.1572
(0.3239)
Variance Equation
휔 휙 훽 훾 훿 푑 푄2(20)
0.1109★★★
(0.0321)
0.4256★★★
(0.0924)
0.5473★★★
(0.0949)
0.1173★★★
(0.0234)
2.1876★★★
(0.0728)
0.2351★★★
(0.0295)
20.470
[0.307]
Notes: As in Table 5.
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